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BOOK BEVIEWS
COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN ... SELECTED SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS, 1948-60, by John M. Maki.' With translations by Ikeda

Masaaki, David C. S. Sissons, and Kurt Steiner. Seattle: University
of Washington Press. 1964. Pp. xi, 445. $9.50.
Judicial review in the United States has had a turbulent history.
Born out of bitter political conflict between the Republican and the
Federalist Parties, it has suffered frequently from various weaknesses;
it has undergone the most striking changes from centralism to overemphasis on state rights, from excessive protection of property rights
and free enterprise to determined defense of individual freedoms. The
manner in which judicial review is being performed, rather than the
power itself, has been under continuous attack. Cassandra warnings
have made of the danger of judicial supremacy or oligarchy. Recently,
the Supreme Court, after having established new barriers against racial
discrimination, has been accused of aggressiveness or improper
"activism." Nevertheless, judicial review has grown in this country,
and it is a strong check on the legislative and executive branches. Its
disappearance would change the character of our government to something thoroughly un-American.
The framers of the new Constitution of Japan, whose identity is no
longer a secret, followed the British model with respect to the executive
branch and its parliamentary responsibility, but established the judiciary along American lines. They adopted the institution of judicial
review by providing in Article 81 that the Supreme Court should be
the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality
of any law, order, regulation or official act. Those who wrote this
provision into fundamental law of the oriental nation must have
expected the adoption of judicial review to contribute to Japan's
democratization, which was the principal objective of General MacArthur's occupation in its initial stage. This appears all the more
significant since Japan, in contrast to the United States, is not a
federal state. Nor does it have prefectural or municipal courts. All
Japanese courts are national and under the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. Students of comparative government agree that judicial review
is most important, if not essential, in a federal system. The reason it
' Professor of Japanese Government and Politics at the Far Eastern Institute of the
University of Washington.
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was introduced into a centralized system of government must have
been because in the light of past Japanese experience, with the authoritarian predominance of the executive and with the neglect of individual
rights for the sake of society as a whole, the revolutionary principles
of the new charter called for a judicial guardian.
Seventeen years have passed since the present Supreme Court of
Japan came into being, and since then it has performed the prerogative
which the judges received as an outright gift, while their American
brethren acquired it only by their own efforts. The time has come to
explore the fascinating question as to what use the Japanese justices
have made of this gift during the first period. Research on this
question by the Western student has met linguistic difficulties. To be
sure, important decisions have been discussed in analyses written in
English. A few have been translated into English by the Secretariat
of the Japanese Supreme Court, but there has remained a definite need
for a more extensive collection of decisions in translation. With a fine
sense of selectivity, Professor John M. Maki of the University of
Washington, a well known scholar of Japanese affairs, has chosen
twenty-six decisions translated into English. His book also contains a
Preface and a valuable Introduction, which examines the pertinent
provisions of the Constitution and gives information concerning the
organization and work of the courts. Appended are an English translation of the new Constitution, very helpful biographical data about all
justices past and present, and a bibliography with references to books
and articles consulted in preparation of the volume. Mr. Maki himself
translated seven decisions, Professor Ikeda Masaaki of St. Paul's
University in Tokyo, ten, David C. S. Sissons, an Australian scholar,
eight, while Professor Kurt Steiner of Stanford University contributed
the translation of the so-called Fukuoka PatricideDecision on which
he had previously commented.2
Mr. Maid is a political scientist. As a non-lawyer, he is to be
congratulated on his courage in penetrating the mysteries of Japanese
law and judicial arguments. Although linguistically well equipped for
such a task, he must have faced seemingly insurmountable difficulties
in reaching a clear understanding of the sometimes lengthy, complex,
and ambiguous opinions. Having had ample experience with Japanese
jurists, this reviewer appreciates the tremendous effort involved in
2 Steiner, A Japanese Cause Cilbre; The Fukuoka PatricideCase, 5 Am J. ComP.
L. 106 (1956).
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following their legal thought process. However, the fact that a political
scientist devoted himself to such a project confirms the truth that
judicial interpretations of a constitution are not merely legal exercises.
They reflect political and social problems of contemporary life.
Mr. Maki and his co-translators have achieved the main purpose of
this publication: to familiarize English readers with the work of the
Court.
Avoiding as far as possible technical legal terms, the translations
have attained a high degree of intelligibility. Each decision is introduced by an editorial note summarizing the problem involved and,
where necessary, the facts of the case. These summaries are followed
by quotations of the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, laws or
ordinances. Moreover, footnotes suggest explanations of obscure
sections of the opinions and provide other comments.
The collection covers several famous and much discussed decisions.
Some of these are: the case of "Lady Chatterley'sLover," in which the
Court defined obscenity as a factor excluded from the protection that
the Constitution provides for freedom of expression; the Niigata and
Tokyo Ordinance cases involving freedom of assembly and prior
restraint; the Fukuoka Patricide case in which the Court ruled on an
argument that a provision in the Criminal Code which provides that
injury inflicted on a lineal ascendant is subject to heavier penalty
than the same crime committed against any other person, contrary to
the principle of equality under the law, and the Land Reform case
which was taken to the courts by former land owners who, under the
land reform, had been compelled to sell their land for a low price fixed
by statute and who argued that this price did not constitute "just
compensation" as required by the charter for expropriation for public
use. There are some very interesting less known cases in Mr. Maki's
collection. Twenty-two are concerned with the nature and limitation
of individual freedoms, of which the Japanese Bill of Rights provides
a generous catalogue. The choice of cases was obviously motivated by
the desire to show the variety of constitutional problems which have
faced the Supreme Court. Only four decisions deal with issues other
than civil rights. The controversial war renunciation clause played a
decisive role in the Sunakawa case, in which the constitutionality of the
stationing of the United States Forces in Japan was challenged. Two
decisions pertain to the scope of judicial review and by limiting it to
concrete legal disputes between specific parties, the Court avoided
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touching on the politically explosive substantive questions raised: the
constitutionality of the National Police Reserve, the first post-war
military force of Japan, and the dissolution of the House of Representatives in August 1952. On the latter point Justice Mano wrote a
polemic supplementary opinion. He did the same in connection with
the last case of the collection, which involved problems of separation
of powers and local autonomy. This case was decided on purely
technical procedural grounds. Chief Justice Tanaka and Justice
Kuriyama dissented.
Of these twenty-six decisions, none declared any law or ordinance
unconstitutional. Instead restrictions on civil rights in such enactments were upheld, usually on considerations of public welfare or
abuse of freedom. The only instance in which the Court ruled in
favor of the challenger of constitutionality was when it refused to
admit as evidence the confession of an accused obtained by third
degree police methods. Minority opinions were written in ten cases,
one justice dissented in three cases, two justices in four, four justices
in two, and five justices in one case.
There are few unanimous decisions, however so-called supplementary opinions abound. They correspond to concurring opinions in our
terminology. Since they frequently express the strongest disagreement
with the arguments supporting the majority decision, though concurring in the result, the Japanese term may be even more appropriate.
The separate opinions, whether dissenting or supplementary, show the
amazing diversity in the legal and political philosophy of the fifteen
justices. They reveal their psychology, and occasionally, their personal
antagonisms, apparently inevitable in a collegiate body burdened with
heavy responsibility. The history of our own Supreme Court illustrates
this truth. It is regrettable that, unlike our practice, the publication
of a decision of Japan's highest tribunal does not designate the justice
who wrote the majority opinion.
The Introduction of the volume is primarily descriptive. Mr. Maki's
concentration on the Suprame Court gives this section of his book its
specific value. His statistical data on the continuously increasing work
load of the Court and its members with the resulting delay of justice,
make clear how inadequate the number of 1,220 courts and 2,387
judges is in a nation of ninety-six million inhabitants, even if one
assumes that the Japanese continue, at least to some extent, in their
aversion to taking their disputes to the courts.
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An important observation could have been made regarding the age
of the fifteen justices listed as in office on January 1st, 1959. They
were all elderly men. In the meantime an almost complete turnover
has taken place on the bench of the Supreme Court. Chief Justice
Kotaro Tanaka, who had reached the statutory maximum age of
seventy, has been succeeded by Professor Kisaburo Yokota. Eleven
associate justices had to retire for the same reason. Only three judges
of Mr. Maki's list remain as members of the Court. The youngest of
the new appointees is fifty-eight years old, five are between sixty-five
and seventy. Although judgeship in a highest tribunal requires maturity and experience, the Japanese predilection for old men appears to
be carried too far. One cannot help feeling that some rejuvenation
might be beneficial.
I suggest that two matters could have received greater elaboration.
The first is the enormous importance of the Court's new jurisdiction
over administrative acts. The review, not necessarily from the point
of view of constitutionality but as a check on any type of illegality,
has been generally authorized in the Administrative Litigation Procedure Law. After the Court of Administrative Litigation was abolished, the regular courts of law not only took over its jurisdiction but
assumed much more extensive review authority than the abolished
Court possessed.
The second matter is the adoption of the written opinion of the
individual judge. The old practice did not facilitate the progressive
development of judicial ideas. It consisted in strictly limiting the
writing and publication of decisions to the majority opinion, while
the overruled dissenters were silenced. The judge in charge of the case
had to write the majority opinion even if he belonged to the dissenting
minority. This compelled him to express views which he actually
rejected. Frequently dissenting opinions in our Supreme Court have
become the law of the land after the passage of time. In the case of
the Japanese, the introduction of separate opinions has been a particularly interesting experiment in the light of their reluctance to
express disagreement openly, a trait characteristic of a nation which
values politeness and harmony. Some of the justices have rapidly
adjusted themselves to the new practice, of which they have often
made vigorous use, while others have not done so. Dissenting opinions
have usually been written by the same few justices: Fujita, Mano, and
to a lesser degree Kuriyama.
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The publication of individual opinions could also serve as a source
of information for the people who take seriously their constitutional
right of recall of Supreme Court judges. While, in agreement with
Mr. Maki, I attribute to such a referendum a symbolical value giving
emphasis to popular sovereignty. It may be worth noting that Chief
Justice Tanaka expresses the belief that this popular sovereignity has
been instrumental in linking the people psychologically with the
Supreme Court and in stressing its importance.'
A couple of technical points may be added. The new Constitution
was not promulgated on May 3, 1947, but that was the date of its
coming into force. The promulgation by the Emperor took place six
months earlier after the enactment by the Diet, on November 3, 1946.
In describing the jurisdiction of the summary courts, Mr. Maki
states that they are prohibited from handing out prison sentences,
and cases in which a summary court judge deems it appropriate that
such a punishment should be imposed, must be transferred by him
to the district court. Article 33 of the Court Organization Law
provides in paragraph 2, sentence 1, a modification of the rule that
imprisonment or a graver penalty cannot be imposed. Article 33
authorizes the court to punish certain common offenses, such as theft
and embezzlement, with imprisonment not exceeding three years. According to paragraph 3 of the same Article, the transfer to a district
court is required only "when a summary court deems it proper to
impose a punishment exceeding the limits prescribed in the preceding
paragraph," which means when the court wants to go beyond the
three years allowed in paragraph 2. However, these are very minor
oversights in an otherwise clear and thorough exposition, and it is
amazing that the author understood unfamiliar legal terminology
so well.
The last and most important part of the Introduction, which
Mr. Maid characterizes as a "brief and impressionistic critique of
the work of the Supreme Court in the area of constitutional interpretation," calls for some critical comments. Two main objections can be
made to the author's evaluation. The first is that he minimizes the
mission of Japan's highest tribunal and overemphasizes the prerogatives of the Diet. The second is that his judgment on the Court's
performance is a panegyric, or to say the least, an apology rather
than a critique.
3

KoTARo TANAKA, THE DEMOCRATIZATIO" OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN JAPAN

(1958).
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In the case of the first objection, he is quite right in pointing out
that in Japan conflicts of a constitutional nature are reduced by the
absence of questions of federalism, and that in a system of codified
law there is less need and opportunity for creative judicial review than
in one of judicial precedents. His further argument, which is that
great care had been taken by the Japanese authorities and by the
occupation that all laws should reflect the spirit of the new Constitution, has lesser weight. One may doubt that the bureaucrats in the
various Ministries, who drafted the bills, immediately grasped this
spirit or that constitutionality was considered by the politicians in
the Diet to such an extent that would make a judicial check superfluous or less necessary. The controls by the occupation were restricted
to patent violations of the charter and could not cover the hidden ones.
It is also a well known fact that, in its later period, the occupation
greatly relaxed all controls. At this time, democratization was no
longer the overriding objective, rather, due to the cold war and the
Korean conflict the emphasis shifted to national security and defense
against communism. Finally, the occupation ended twelve years ago,
while law-making has continued. However, all the minimizing factors
are outweighed by the novelty of the constitutional principles which
make judicial guardianship absolutely indispensable.
Mr. Maki, on the other hand, reasons that all the new freedoms of
the people were introduced to Japan by the occupation, and that the
Court had no part in their creation. Since in the area of constitutions
and laws everything depends on interpretation, the judicial mission
of "eternal vigilance" is, in my opinion, all the more formidable. The
author relies on his overoptimistic appraisal of Japan as "a society
that is truly free, where the standard freedoms of democracy are
widely enjoyed and freely exercised." I am convinced that history
will pay even greater tribute to MacArthur, the proconsul of Japan,
than to the war hero and that the reform work under his leadership
achieved great success, due to a considerable extent to the response
of the Japanese people. Although sudden changes are not infrequent
in history, I cannot share the belief either that a kind of instant
democracy was brewed in the General's headquarters. Stability in
the forms of parliamentary government exists but Japan remains in
a stage of transition where the forces of real progress struggle with
those of the past and with radicalism of the right and of the left.
What strikes me as most puzzling is the author's repeated reference
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to legislative supremacy, which he derives from Article 41 of the
Constitution. The latter defines the Diet as "the highest organ of state
power." This, Maki remarks, "clearly... places the Diet over the
Court." My interpretation is that the clause constituted an additional
gesture of respect for the sovereignty of the people and their elected
representatives. It did not establish subordination to the Diet of the
two other branches nor did it invalidate the articles which embody the
doctrine of checks and balances. In contrast to Mr. Maki, I think
that this doctrine is well developed in the Constitution of Japan. As
the executive branch, the Cabinet is collectively responsible to the
Diet but it may, through the Emperor, dissolve the House of Representatives (the controversial question of when this can be done is
discussed in Case XXV). The judiciary is subject to appointment
by the Cabinet, popular recall, and impeachment. On the other hand,
Article 81 makes the Court's function of serving as a check on the
two other branches by judicial review abundantly clear. I find it
hard to understand Mr. Maki's remark about "the Court's refusal
to act as a checkrein on either the legislative or the executive process."
I cannot discover any such abdication in the translated decisions.
In the Sunakawa case, the Court merely held that the determination
of the constitutionality of the Security Treaty as a highly political
issue was "not adaptable to review by a judicial court."
This reviewer approaches with great reluctance Mr. Maki's evaluation of the Court's performance. Having had a modest part in its
establishment, I would be happy if I could fully agree with his
extremely favorable judgment. The Supreme Court is still in its
formative stage. Considering the often amazing tempo of changes in
Japan, its future growth is promising. Looked at from this standpoint,
the Court has done better than could have been expected in adjusting
itself to the transitional complexities of its first period. To credit it,
however, with a full understanding of the spirit of the Constitution,
as Mr. Maki does, and with "the bringing together of law and liberty"
as a "great and unique.., contribution" is quite another matter.
The author deals with two major criticisms, namely the Court's
failure to protect fundamental human rights valiantly and its reluctance to check the power of the two other branches. While admitting
their abstract merit, he regards them as based on the expectation that
the pattern of the United States Supreme Court would be followed.
He believes that the work of the Japanese Court can be appreciated
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only within the context peculiar to Japan. When it comes to human
rights, one may well challenge this observation. Principles of natural
law do not resolve all legal questions but they are generally recognized
in the area of "certain inalienable rights." They are reflected in the
Constitution of Japan as well as in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Moreover, judicial review is not exclusively an
American institution. The Supreme Court of India, for example,
which is one year younger than its Japanese counterpart, exercises it
with considerable vigor.
Interestingly enough, the excessive self-restraint of Japanese justices
is being criticized more severely by Japanese than by foreign observers. Justice Fujita's impressive objections to the Court's continuous
use of the public welfare test have been supported by Japanese scholars.' The overcautious attitude of the majority can, of course, be
explained by hierarchical tradition, inadequacy of judicial prestige,
conservative temperaments, and a lifelong analytical approach to legal
interpretation. The latter is still very conspicuous in the separate
opinions of certain justices. Study of the cases in this volume shows
that the Court, apart from civil rights problems, had to decide questions of enormous legal and political consequence, and it handled these
latter quite wisely and realistically. Our own Supreme Court has not
ceased to struggle with the dilemma between individual rights and
national security, as shown by the sharp division of opinions in communist cases. The Japanese justices give more than lip service to the
importance of constitutional freedoms, but there remains a tendency
to refuse protection to their undesirable use and to label this as abuse.
The recognition that freedom of expression, even in the form of
boisterous assemblies and demonstrations, is the keynote of democracy
has not yet induced the Court to replace its vague public welfare test
by a stricter standard, such as the clear and present danger concept.
There was a timid beginning in this direction in the Niigata case but
the Court did not further develop this line. Resolute use of civil rights
often appears to conflict with the public welfare. The delicate question
of just when it becomes an abuse unworthy of constitutional protection
is a matter of degree, and a finer criterion is needed to balance the
conflicting interests. In the light of Japan's charismatic tradition,
4 See particularly the penetrating analysis by Professor Ito, Tokyo University,
assisted by Professor Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Northwestern University. Ito, The
Rule of Law: Constitutional Development in LAW IN JAPAN 205 (von Mehren ed.
1963).

1964]

BOOK REVIEWS

the preference of public welfare to individual rights must be taken
seriously because the danger exists that it could result in the same
situation that prevailed under the Meiji Constitution when fundamental human rights were granted only "within the limits of the law."
I see no reason for pessimism, on the whole. The progressive
decisions of several district courts as well as some of the separate
opinions of Supreme Court justices augur well for future developments. They show courage, imagination, and understanding of the
spirit of the Constitution. We may expect further progress from the
new men on the bench. It might be significant to note that in a
decision of November, 1962, the Supreme Court declared a provision
of the Customs Law unconstitutional because it violated private
property rights.
These observations are in no way designed to detract from the
great value of Mr. Maid's extremely interesting work and from the
fine contribution it makes to our knowledge of Japan's highest tribunal
and of the most important and exciting aspects of its performance.
ALFRED C. OPPLER*
LAW IN JAPAN:

THE LEGAL

ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY.

Edited

by Arthur T. von Mehren.' Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
1963. Pp. 706, xxxviii. $15.00.
More than a decade has passed since the end of the American
occupation. During this period, Japan has continued to prosper with
a highly viable economy and a modem democratic polity. Much of
this is attributable to one of the most successful military occupations
in all history. America's influence on all aspects of Japanese society
was great. How lasting it will be remains an intriguing question.
Law in Japanis an appraisal of this influence in the law.
The book is an outgrowth of a conference on Japanese law sponsored by the Ford Foundation. At the conference, Japanese legal
scholars presented papers describing aspects of the Japanese legal
system. These articles have been edited, grouped, and analyzed in
the present volume. The articles are arranged in three groups:
(1) "The Legal System and the Law's Processes"; (2) "The
* Former Chief, Legislation and Justice Division, Legal Section, GHQ SCAP,
Tokyo, Japan.

I Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.

